America, Korea and the World: 1945-1961

Following World War II, there remained only two superpowers on Earth: the United States and the Soviet Union. Despite being allies in the war against Germany and Japan, the two now found themselves at odds with each other. Was the world big enough for two superpowers, and what is to be done when the very existence of one seemingly threatens the existence of the other? With America being “democratic” and the Soviet Union being “Communist” (words I find deceiving, but I will use them for simplicity) there really was little common ground for the two countries.

The Next Battleground: Korea

In the years after WWII, Germany was divided between the West (America, England, France) and the East (Soviet Union). As we know, a wall was erected (the “Berlin Wall”) to keep the two sides separate.

Korea was also divided up after the war. While it had been the property of Japan since 1910, Korea was soon divided up between America and the Soviet Union much as Germany had been partitioned. Japanese forces were to be expelled from the country. The division was placed at the 38th Parallel, with no one being allowed to cross over.

The Soviet Union installed a Soviet-friendly government in the north, while America set up a democratic government in the south.

This partition was intended to be temporary, with the Korean people to be reunited as one country. However, as of this writing (May 2007), there is a still a stark difference between north and south. While today we see North Korea and South Korea as two unique entities, this was not the case at the time despite the different governments. Any conflict would be seen as a civil war rather than an external invasion (comparable to the American Civil War where the South had its own government).

While there were American forces in Korea directly following World War II, they were pulled out before the beginning of the Korean Conflict. America at this point had the mindset that all war was total war (rather than limited war), making Korea “militarily dispensable within the pattern of American security.” According to John Spanier, “A Soviet occupation of Korea would not raise Korea’s strategic significance, since the peninsula could be neutralized by American air and sea power.” [Spanier: 60]

George Kennan’s Long Telegram

George F. Kennan was the Deputy Chief of Mission of the United States to the USSR from 1944 to 1946, and had studied the Soviet Union from the inside. He was also a strong supporter of the Berlin Wall.

In response to a question about Soviet resistance to the World Bank, Kennan sent President Truman his assessment of the current Soviet situation February 22, 1946. It was filled with not only policy suggestions, but a thorough explanation of the background leading to such decisions.

Basically, Kennan was in favor of Soviet containment in a non-aggressive sense. He felt that building strong alliances would be a good idea, whereas attacking the Soviet Union would probably cause more harm than good to the attacker (the United States). Some interpreted him as being in favor of more aggressive policies, as Kennan noted the Soviets were “highly sensitive to the logic of force.” He also made the assertion (typical at the time) that the Soviets would use American labor unions and women’s groups to push their cause. But ultimately, Kennan saw the Soviet Union’s propaganda system as their biggest weakness and felt that the best defense for America would be a solid American education while the Soviet Union crumbled from within.

Policy Planning Study 23

Another important document written by George Kennan was Policy Planning Study 23, released on February 24, 1948. Unlike the somewhat personal nature of the long telegram, this document is more in the “realpolitik” style, matter-of-fact without regard to normative issues. Kennan’s overly methodical style remains.

One often-quoted passage reads as follows:

…we have about 50% of the world’s wealth, but only 6.3% of its population… In this situation, we cannot fail to be the object of envy and resentment. Our real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will permit us to maintain this position of disparity… To do so, we will have to dispense with all sentimentality and day-dreaming; and our attention will have to be concentrated everywhere on our immediate national objectives… We should cease to talk about vague and — for the Far East — unreal objectives such as human rights, the raising of living standards, and democratization. The day is not far off when we are going to have to deal in straight power concepts. The less we are then hampered by idealistic slogans, the better. (emphasis mine)

What I think is of importance here is that the government was very open about the nation’s wealth and the military might such wealth could command. If we admit having the world’s leading economy (and military by extension), I suspect the government could not realistically consider the Soviet Union to be the imminent threat many would make it out to be.

Professor Noam Chomsky, in his book Turning the Tide, calls this document “noteworthy” because the content is very blunt, despite being written by “one of the most thoughtful and humane of US planners” [Chomsky 1985: 48]. Ironically, this planning document calling for an ignoring of rights was drafted the same year the United States signed the UN Declaration of Human Rights. Perhaps more interesting is that Kennan was replaced by Paul Nitze (key author of NSC-68) on January 1, 1950. The shift from Kennan to Nitze correlates directly with a shift in America’s foreign policy, especially with regard to the Soviet Union.

Upon being replaced, George Kennan became the Counselor to the Department of State.

South Korea Attacks North Korea

More than 250 guerrillas from the South are said to have launched an attack on North Korean villages along the east coast in June 1949. Some reached the town of Wonsan, although all but 50 were killed in two weeks.

NSC-68 contra George Kennan

While Kennan (in his telegram) wanted to approach the Soviet Union with caution and with a degree of level-headed reason, not everyone shared his view on the matter. Truman’s advisers in the National Security Council released a report on April 14, 1950 (known as NSC-68, and declassified in either 1975 or 1977 — sources differ) that pushed for Soviet containment in a far more aggressive manner.

Kennan’s telegram did lead to some Cold War policy, but it is not to be confused with NSC-68. According to the Wikipedia, there were some very key differences.

“The Long Telegram called for economic pressures against the USSR, whereas NSC-68 called for militaristic pressures. Kennan believed that it was not only acceptable but futile to resist the spread of Soviet Communism to nations surrounding the USSR as these states would constitute a legitimate security buffer-zone, but NSC-68 dictated that any and all “losses” of nations to communism (epitomized in the Domino theory) were unacceptable and a threat to US national security.”

They encouraged an increase in defense spending, and felt that a military economy would help prevent a depression for America (much as military spending during WWII had helped). With regards to the Soviet Union, there was a fear that a stockpile of nuclear weapons would lead to nuclear war, with the USSR being able to launch a surprise attack on America by 1954. By attacking the Soviet Union in a smaller, insignificant region (such as Korea) and winning, we would discourage a much larger attack and prevent a direct war with the USSR.

The Korean War (as well as the Vietnam War) was anticipated in NSC-68 in such phrases where efforts should be focused on “fomenting and supporting unrest and revolt in selected strategic satellite countries” and the need to “foster the seeds of destruction within the Soviet system”.

NSC-68 can also be seen as a historical document that pushed the viewpoint of America as the world’s greatest superpower and encouraged American imperialism. Th document called the Soviet Union an enemy “unlike previous aspirants to hegemony… animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own” (implying that hegemony ought to be solely for the United States). They also did not want the Soviet Union to “impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world” and wished to accomplish this by, ironically, imposing an absolute (American) authority over the rest of the world.

Lastly, NSC-68 noted that “a large measure of sacrifice and discipline will be demanded of the American people”, with the emphasis on “discipline”. Americans would need to be united and conform to the idea that the Soviet threat was real and great; dissent would make America “vulnerable” (again, with reference to the allegations that Communists might sneak their ideas in through labor unions and such).

There was, naturally, some disagreement with the conclusions drawn by NSC-68. George Kennan, for one, was not in favor of it. Willard Thorp, President Truman’s Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, did not believe that the “USSR is steadily reducing the discrepancy between its overall economic strength and that of the United States.” Thorp responded, “I do not feel that this position is demonstrated, but rather the reverse… The actual gap is widening in our favor.” He pointed out that in 1949 the US economy had increased twice that of the Soviet Union. Steel production in the US outpaced the Soviet Union by 2 million tons, and stockpiling of goods and oil production far exceeded Soviet amounts.

The members of the NSC study group, much less known than their report, were: Chairman Paul Nitze (Director of Policy Planning for the State Department), John P. Davies (an expert on China), Robert Tufts, Robert Hooker, Chip Bohlen (an adviser to George C. Marshall) and Major General Truman Landon.

Senator Joseph McCarthy

Not only were Truman’s advisers pushing for a war, but Senator Joseph McCarthy was putting pressure on the administration, as well. McCarthy was rabidly anti-Communist, and accused Truman of being soft on Communism. More generally, McCarthy accused the Democrats of “twenty years of treason” with regard to Communism. This would not be good for Truman politically to appear pro-Communist, so he took the accusation to heart.

McCarthy also declared that Truman’s State Department had at least 205 “known Communists”, including the authors of NSC-68. The sheer nonsense of an anti-Communist document being written by Communists illustrates how absurd some of McCarthy’s positions were. Nonetheless, he was very influential and put great pressure on the administration.

McCarthy’s rationale for his position, which I consider absurd, is explained by John Spanier: “America’s China policy had ended in Communist control of the mainland; the administration leaders and the State Department were responsible for the formulation and execution of foreign policy; thus, the government must be filled with Communists and Communist sympathizers who ‘tailored’ American policy to advance the global aims of the Soviet Union.” [Spanier: 68]

If Spanier accurately describes McCarthy’s views, we could make similar observations today: if George W. Bush and his administration make decisions which allowed 9/11 to happen and encourage the growth of terror abroad, clearly they must be terrorists themselves or terrorist sympathizers. When written this way, it comes across as a sign of lunacy.

Truman’s Military Increase

While it could be argued that George Kennan was more informed than McCarthy or the National Security Council, and certainly more rational in his thinking, Truman was a pushover to criticism. He increased defense spending each year through 1952, as well as raising the level of troops. One could easily say that it makes sense to increase troops and spending as a war progresses, while others would argue that these actions only further justified the criticisms of Truman’s detractors.

More Pre-War Aggression

In April 1950, Philip C. Jessup of the State Department explained that a war was already raging in Korea. “There is constant fighting between the South Korean Army and bands that infiltrate the country from the North,” he said. “There are very real battles, involving perhaps one or two thousand men. When you go to this boundary, as I did … you see troop movements, fortifications, and prisoners of war.” The North Korean government claimed that in 1949 alone, South Korea had “perpetrated 2,617 armed incursions” across the border for “murder, kidnapping, pillage and arson”. [Blum: 46]

Politics in Korea, Pre-Conflict

In May 1950, things were not looking well for President Rhee in South Korea. His party was able to secure 48 parliament seats in the election, but the other parties grabbed a total of 120, outnumbering the ruling group. Rhee had arrested 30 political opponents just before the election (alleged Communists) but not even this extreme maneuver was able to save him. [LaFeber: 96]

Kim Il Sung in North Korea tried to take advantage of Rhee’s problems on June 7. Kim pushed for a country-wide general election to secure a reunification of Korea. Rhee tried to stop the Southerners from hearing of this plan, which only intensified the efforts in the North. [LaFeber: 96] William Blum speculates that “like countless statesmen before and after him”, it wouldn’t have been strange if Rhee chose “to play the war card to rally support for his shaky rule.” [Blum: 47]

Days Prior to the War

The United Nations Military Observer Group was on a “field trip” in Korea, ending their visit on June 23, 1950. Later that day, South Korea began a two day bombardment of the North, and on the morning of the 25th, South Korea attacked the western town of Haeju in the North. North Korean radio broadcast news of the attack before noon. Historians would later try to deny the capture of Haeju by blaming reports on an exaggerating South Korean officer. But reports of the capture also came from “American military observers” and “American officials” in the English press. Furthermore, writer John Gunther was present on the 25th when an American official in Japan received a phone call and informed Gunther, “The South Koreans have attacked North Korea!” [Blum: 46-47]

As the Military Observer Group had left days before, no objective group was witness to the events of the 25th, making it difficult or even impossible to pinpoint which side escalated the fight to a full civil war. [Blum: 46]

North Korea Invades South Korea

The Korean War is said to have officially begun on June 25, 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. They came equipped with 150 Soviet-made T-34 tanks, the North Korean military began the war with about 180 aircraft, including 40 YAK fighters and 70 attack bombers.

While we have already outlined how aggression had been perpetrated by both sides prior to this point, the North Korean invasion is considered the official beginning — a decision that conveniently puts South Korea and its allies (the United Nations and America) in the light of defenders rather than aggressors. The New York Times found this North aggression unusual, noting on June 26 that before the outbreak, “[t]he warlike talk strangely [had] almost all come from South Korean leaders.”

America felt obligated to help South Korea, because if “the United Sates [sic] merely stood by while South Korea fell, it would demonstrate to the world that it was either afraid of Russian power or unconcerned with the safety of its allies.” [Spanier: 60] So while the planners were aware that Korea had no use to America as a strategic military location, fighting there would be a good way to inflate the image of American power and goodwill.

By June 28, North Korea had occupied Seoul, the capital of South Korea. North Korea did not expect the government to put up a fight (they assumed a quick surrender) or for outside intervention. They were wrong on both counts.

The United Nations Enters the War

On June 27, the United Nations voted to aid South Korea in defending itself against North Korea. The resolution passed the Security Council 7-1 (Yugoslavia was opposed; Egypt and India abstained from voting). [LaFeber: 98-99] Egypt took issue with the phrasing of the resolution wherein the the North Korean invasion was described as an “unprovoked aggression”, and Egypt felt the word “unprovoked” was a clear misinterpretation of the facts.

Yugoslavia took the position that “there seemed to be lack of precise information that could enable the Council to pin responsibility” and suggested that North Korea be allowed to present their version of events. This suggestion was declined. [Blum: 48]

The legality of this resolution was questioned because the Soviet Union (represented by Yakov Malik) was absent from voting (and would have surely vetoed such an idea). The Soviets were currently boycotting the United Nations because the organization refused to accept the legitimacy of Red China. [Goettel: 193] Furthermore, Russia “felt that the U.N. was an American-dominated organization rather than a true international body.” [Goettel: 191] This concern is essentially as true now as it was then, but further discussion falls outside the realm of this paper.

Legality issues also arise because the war in Korea was legally defined as a civil war rather than an invasion, leaving the conflict outside of the United Nations’ powers of intervention. Perhaps surprisingly, just a few months after the war began, the chief United States delegate to the United Nations, Warren Austin, would take a similar position. The New York Times reported Austin saying on October 1, 1950:

“The artificial barrier which has divided North and South Korea has no basis for existence either in law or in reason. Neither the United Nations, its Commission on Korea, nor the Republic of Korea recognize such a line. Now the North Koreans, by armed attack upon the Republic of Korea, have denied the reality of any such line.” (emphasis mine) [Blum: 45-46]

Regardless of legality, the resolution passed. William Blum points out that “in 1950 the United Nations was in no way a neutral or balanced organization. The great majority of members were nations very dependent upon the United States for economic recovery and development.” [Blum: 48] How much this dependence was reflected in the vote remains open to interpretation.

America was set to lead the war, with sixteen countries supporting them. This was certainly an American war, however. The United States provided 50 percent of the ground forces (South Korea provided much of the remainder), 86 percent of the naval power, and 93 percent of the air power. [LaFeber: 101] (Elinor Goettel puts the figures at America supplying 48% of the troops and South Korea providing 43%, which is probably more accurate. [Goettel: 193])

It is important to distinguish that while in common discourse this conflict is seen as a United Nations operation assisting South Korea against North Korea, it was not truly a United Nations force but an American force with United Nations members supporting them. Professor Michael Akehurst, a specialist in matters of international law, sums it up as follows:

It is doubtful whether the forces in Korea constituted a United Nations force in any meaningful sense. They were always called a United Nations force, they were authorized by the Security Council to fly the United Nations flag and they were awarded United Nations medals by the General Assembly. But all the decisions concerning the operations of the forces were taken by the USA … and the Commander took his orders from the USA … the decision to dismiss the original Commander, General MacArthur, and to replace him by a new Commander, was taken unilaterally by the USA. [Akehurst: 223-224]

Legality of the American Invasion

From one perspective, the attack on North Korea could be defended because it was intended to be a defensive maneuver: America wanted to prevent the takeover of South Korea by the North, and also to stop the spread of Communism and Soviet influence. North Korea could be seen as a “proxy” or “adjutant” country for the Soviet Union.

Yet, from another perspective Truman could be seen as rash and legally deceptive. There was no evidence of Soviet intentions to support North Korea in a South Korean invasion, leaving the motives appearing more as an appeasement of McCarthy and the NSC than any external threat. Furthermore, Truman characterized the Korean situation as a “conflict” (essentially a police action) rather than a “war” to skirt the Congress. Only the Congress, not the President, has the authority to declare a war — so Truman simply used another term.

The War Continues

After American entrance to the war, victories were achieved relatively quickly. The North Koreans were confronted by early July 1950, and soon South Korea was again liberated. The quick success of the Americans can largely be credited to General Douglas MacArthur, a veteran of both World Wars and a brilliant strategist. He is not without his critics, however. Bernard Brodie calls MacArthur an “overweening, bombastic, and arrogant man, brilliant but also intensely narcissistic.” [Brodie: 77]

The Soviet Union pledged on July 4, 1950 that they would not get involved, with Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko taking the legal position that the conflict was a “civil war among the Koreans.” [LaFeber: 99]

McCarthy Strikes Again

Despite American victories, Senator McCarthy was not ready to pull his punches. On July 12, 1950, he wrote to the President, “Today American boys lie dead in the mud of Korean valleys. Some have their hands tied behind their back, their faces shot away by Communist machine guns.” McCarthy said these alleged atrocities occurred due to the Congressional program for Korea being “sabotaged”. [LaFeber: 105] With McCarthy, Truman was damned if he fought the Communists and damned if he didn’t.

South Korea Oppressive?

By July 25, Stanley Earl had resigned as a labor adviser to the American aid mission in South Korea. He called the South Korean government “an oppressive regime” which “did very little to help the people”, and felt that “an internal South Korean rebellion against the Rhee Government would have occurred if the forces in North Korea had not invaded.” [Blum: 47]

No Gun Ri

United States veterans interviewed by the Associated Press said they machine-gunned hundreds of helpless civilians under a railway bridge at No Gun Ri on July 26, 1950.

A week later, according to other veterans, a US general ordered the destruction of two strategic bridges across the Naktong River killing hundreds of civilians. “It was a tough decision,” wrote Hobart Gay, the 1st Cavalry Division commander, in a now-declassified document, “because up in the air with the bridge went hundreds of refugees.”

War Rages On…

Dean Acheson praised the war efforts and assured Americans on national television on September 10 that China would not enter the war. “I should think it would be sheer madness… and I see no advantage to them in doing it,” he said. Acheson believed China’s primary concern was with Russia. [LaFeber: 109]

On September 15, MacArthur landed an army at Inchon (on the west coast) 150 miles behind the North Koreans. (Serving as an aide-decamp to MacArthur during the landing was none other than Alexander M. Haig, future Secretary of State under Ronald Reagan. [Hersh: 56]) MacArthur went north, rather than south, and divided the North Koreans in half.

On September 27, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed MacArthur that his objective was “the destruction of the North Korean Forces.” Authorization was given “to conduct military operations… north of the 38th parallel in Korea, provided that at the time of such operations there has been no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or Chinese Communist Forces, no announcement of intended entry, nor a threat to counter your operations militarily in North Korea.” Any American-Chinese conflict was strictly forbidden. [Brodie: 71]

On September 29, General Marshall followed up MacArthur’s orders with an “eyes only” telegram. Marshall wrote, “We want you to feel unhampered tactically and strategically to proceed north of the 38th parallel.” Bernard Brodie assesses this message was to sooth MacArthur, who had to answer to people clearly ranked beneath him. Marshall’s intention was by no means to give MacArthur free rein, though this telegram would later raise some eyebrows. [Brodie: 71-72]

On September 30, the United Nation forces reached the 38th Parallel.

By October 1950, the United Nations forces continued northward into North Korea and decided that Korea would be united — but under the government of South Korea. John Spanier sums up this decision by explaining that “Inchon, in short, transformed the whole character of the war — from a defensive action seeking only to reestablish the status quo, to an offensive one designed to effect a permanent change in the status quo.” [Spanier: 62] In theory, the war could have been ended September 30 after only two months of conflict and without Chinese intervention had an armistice been sought at this point.

Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai informed Indian Ambassador K. M. Panikkar on October 3 that if American troops crossed the parellel, China would enter the war. Many years later, Dean Acheson would reflect that “Chou’s words were a warning, not to be disregarded, but, on the other hand, not an authoritative statement of policy.” This, quite simply, is a gross understatement. [Brodie: 73]
On October 7, the United Nations General Assembly (rather than the Security Council) passed a resolution approving of the decisions made in Washington. Their objective was “insuring conditions of tranquility throughout the county.” [Brodie: 72]

China Enters the Korean War (October 1950)

On October 8, 1950, the day after American troops crossed the 38th, Chairman Mao Zedong assembled the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army. The members of the PVA were in actuality Chinese regulars from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, but were called volunteers so that their entry into the war would not seem to indicate a state-to-state war between the US and China (and therefore hopefully preventing an invasion into China).

China’s reasons for entering the war are something of debate. Some historians believe the orders came ultimately from Stalin himself. Yet others feel that China “may have acted through fear that the United States was preparing to invade Manchuria.” [North: 205] I suspect an analysis of the facts could pin down a more precise reason, though there seems nothing unusual in China coming to the aid of its Communist brethren. At least no more unusual than America coming to the aid of South Korea.

Wake Island

On October 15, President Truman went to Wake Island for a short, highly publicized meeting with General MacArthur. A dozen American officials began planning the reconstruction of Korea, without consulting the United Nations or Syngman Rhee. [LaFeber: 101]

The CIA had previously told Truman that Chinese involvement was unlikely. MacArthur, saying he was speculating, saw little risk of Chinese involvement. The general explained that the Chinese had lost their window of opportunity to help North Korea’s invasion “in the first or second months”. “We are no longer fearful of their intervention. We no longer stand hat in hand,” explained MacArthur.

MacArthur further assessed the situation by saying that China might move 50,000 or 60,000 men across the Yalu River (out of a total of 125,000 stationed along the river and 300,000 total in all of Manchuria), but as China had no air force they would be lacking air cover. America, meanwhile, now had Air Force bases in Korea. Without cover, “there would be the greatest slaughter.” [LaFeber: 110]

MacArthur further informed Truman that he expected North Korean resistance to end by Thanksgiving and he hoped “to be able to withdraw the Eighth Army to Japan by Christmas.” [Brodie: 74]

Of course, both the CIA and MacArthur were incorrect in their conservative speculations.

China and America Collide

The Chinese finally engaged American troops on October 25, with 270,000 Volunteer Army troops under the command of General Peng Dehuai. This greatly surprised the UN, who had ignored evidence that such a massive force existed. However, after these initial engagements, the Chinese forces pulled back into the mountains. UN leaders saw the withdrawal as a sign of weakness leading to a great underestimation of Chinese fighting capability.

The UN forces continued their advance to the Yalu river, ignoring stern warnings given by the Chinese.

North Korean Capitol Captured

At the end of October, the North Korean capital was captured and a large number of prisoners of war were caught.

American Congressional Elections, 1950

Strengthened by the leadership of Senator Joseph McCarthy and the growing unpopularity of President Truman, the Republicans made some gains in November 1950. They acquired a total of twenty-eight seats in the House and five seats in the Senate. That McCarthy played a role in this victory, there can be no doubt. John Marshall Butler defeated Millard Tydings (a McCarthy foe), Everett Dirksen defeated Majority Leader Scott Lucas, and Richard Nixon defeated Helen Gahagan Douglas. [LaFeber: 107-108]

The Chinese Winter Offensive

On November 19, 1950, with the DPRK forces largely destroyed, Chinese military forces crossed the Yalu River, routing the UN forces and forcing them on a long retreat. Calling the Chinese intervention the beginning of “an entirely new war”, MacArthur repeatedly requested authorization to strike supplies, troops, and airplanes in Manchuria with conventional weapons and also requested permission to deploy nuclear weapons in North Korea. The Truman administration feared that such an action would greatly escalate the war into full-scale conflict with China and possibly draw China’s ally, the Soviet Union, into the conflict. Angered by Truman’s desire to maintain a “limited war,” MacArthur began issuing important statements to the press, warning them of a crushing defeat.

Nukes?

Despite Truman’s disagreement with MacArthur over nuclear weaponry, Truman himself could hint at it when he so chose. During a news conference on November 30, he declared that America would use all the power it had to keep the Chinese in check. This would, of course, include nuclear bombs.

Prime Minister Attlee was quite distressed by this (he had, of course, committed his own troops to Korea and had his reputation on the line) and flew to the United States to meet with Truman on December 4. Truman assured Attlee that no intentions to use the atom bomb were in mind.

General Walker Dies

Lieutenant General Walton Walker, commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, died on December 23, 1950. His jeep crashed into another UN vehicle on an icy road while traveling at a high rate of speed. He had previously developed a close friendship with Dwight Eisenhower, from his time patrolling on the U.S.-Mexican border in 1916. Walker also served in France during World War I, taught classes at West Point, and served under George Marshall in the 1930s. Finally, Walker served under George Patton in World War II, giving him probably one of the most impressive resumes in military history.

More Chinese Aggression

By January 1, Chinese and North Korean soldiers charged across the 38th Parallel. The Chinese repeated their previous tactics of mostly night attacks, with a stealthy approach from positions some distance from the front, followed by a rush with overwhelming numbers, and using trumpets or gongs both for communication and to disorient their foes. Against this UN forces had no remedy, and their resistance crumbled; they retreated rapidly to the south (referred to by UN forces as the “bug-out”).

Seoul was abandoned, and was captured by Communist forces on January 4, 1951.

United Nations Votes Against China

On February 1, 1951 the United Nations voted to declare China aggressors in the Korea Conflict. The vote was 44-7, with 9 countries abstaining. [LaFeber: 114]

Operation Roundup

Operation Roundup was an attack launched by US X Corps toward Hongch’on and P’yonch’ang on February 5, 1951.

Soviet Involvement?

Although Russia was playing no role in the Korean Conflict, this did not stop Dean Acheson from tying them in at given opportunities. Acheson claimed, “It is not only the threat of direct military attack which must be considered, but also that of conquest by default, by pressure, by persuasion, by subversion, by ‘neutralism,’…” [LaFeber: 102]

Operation Killer

Operation Killer was an eight day United Nations offensive that concluded February 28, designed to push Communist forces north of the Han River.

Operation Ripper

Operation Ripper was a military operation conceived by General Ridgway, intended to destroy as much of the People’s Volunteer Army of China and North Korean military from Seoul and of the towns of Hongch’on, fifty miles west of Seoul, and Ch’unch’on, fifteen miles farther to the north and to bring United Nations troops to the 38th parallel.

The operation was launched on March 7, 1951 with the I and IX Corps on the west near Seoul and Hoengsong and X and ROK III Corps in the east, to reach “Line Idaho”, an arc with its apex just south of the 38th Parallel in South Korea. By the end of March, United States forces reached the 38th parallel.

MacArthur is Fired

This first part should be incorporated above closer to Walker’s death.

MacArthur had much pressure against him from a variety of sources for his insubordination, disruptive public comments and the loss of his own men’s support in him. In his own defense against “the radical fringe”, he wrote a letter to Carlos P. Romulo on December 26, 1950:

The campaign of vituperation initiated against me as a result of Red China’s entry into the war was not unexpected. I had warnings from various sources, all reliable, long before Inchon that such a campaign was being planned by the radical fringe. Success at Inchon caused the plan to fail to materialize, but the new situation created by the Chinese offensive was apparently seized upon as the most favorable opportunity for its revival and effectuation. [Carroll: 48]

MacArthur went on the identify the radical fringe attacking him:

The dominant group spearheading the drive has of course been the Communists and their friends, but they have received powerful assistance from those who are so infatuated with the safeguard of Europe that they would sacrifice Asia rather than see any support diverted from Europe. [Carroll: 48]

In March of 1951, after a UN counterattack commanded by Matthew B. Ridgway again turned the tide of the war in the UN’s favor, Truman alerted MacArthur of his intention to initiate “cease-fire” talks. Such news ended any hopes the general had retained of leading a full-scale war against China, and MacArthur quickly issued his own ultimatum to China. MacArthur’s declaration threatened the expansion of the war, and was similar to the recommendations the Joint Chiefs made to Truman. He received a mild rebuke.

On March 24, MacArthur ordered the Chinese to surrender in an ultimatum or face “imminent” destruction.

On April 5, Representative Joe Martin read a letter in the House from MacArthur, written March 24. The letter declared:

“It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms while the diplomats there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you point out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory.” [LaFeber: 119; Brodie: 83]

By April the Joint Chiefs decided MacArthur had to go for military reasons — they had lost confidence in his strategy. On April 9, the Joint Chiefs (including General Bradley, the chairman) all agreed MacArthur had to be relieved. Secretary of Defense Marshall agreed with their assessment. Truman had already decided by this point that MacArthur had to go, but this support from the military made his decision far more politically acceptable to Congress and the American people. [Brodie: 84]

On April 11, 1951 President Truman relieved General MacArthur of his military command. During his radio address that day, Truman explained:

“If history has taught us anything, it is that aggression anywhere in the world is a threat to the peace everywhere in the world. When that aggression is supported by the cruel and selfish rulers of a powerful nation who are bent on conquest, it becomes a clear and present danger to the security and independence of every free nation.” [Brodie: 62]

General Matthew B. Ridgway replaced MacArthur.

When President Truman dismissed MacArthur, this lead to a storm of controversy. Senator Joseph McCarthy charged that Truman and his advisers must have planned the dismissal during late-night sessions when “they’ve had time to get the President cheerful” on Bourbon and Benedictine. McCarthy declared, “That son of a bitch should be impeached.”

MacArthur Returns to America

General MacArthur expected the worst reception from the American people and told his aides, “We’ll just slip into San Francisco after dark while everybody’s at dinner or the movies.” His predictions were wrong, however; over 500,000 cheering admirers awaited his return. Millions attended ticker-tape parades across the country. [Carroll: 50] In New York, it was estimated that 7.5 million people lined the streets to see MacArthur and that 2850 tons ticker tape, confetti and streamers were thrown. [Spanier: 65]

On April 19, 1951, MacArthur addressed Congress and ended with the line, “Old soldiers never die, they just fade away.” President Truman remarked that the speech was “nothing but a bunch of damn bullshit.” [Carroll: 50]

Truman’s popularity plummeted as MacArthur’s gained. He was booed by a crowd when he showed up to throw the first pitch of the season for a baseball game. Multiple state legislatures slammed him for his “irresponsible and capricious action.” Some Republicans even voiced the possibility of impeachment. [Spanier: 65]

Operation Courageous

Operation Courageous was designed to trap large numbers of Chinese and North Korean troops between the Han River (Korea) and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul, opposite the South Korean I Corps. The intent of Operation Courageous was for I Corps, which was composed of the U.S. 25th and 3rd IDs and the Republic Of Korea 1st Division, to advance quickly on the North Korean and Chinese troops and reach the Imjin River with all possible speed.

Operation Courageous was implemented from March 22 through March 28, 1951.

Operation Tomahawk

Operation Tomahawk was an airborne military operation by the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) on March 23, 1951 at Munsan-ni as part of Operation Courageous.

Operation Tomahawk was the airborne half of the plan. This operation was designed to drop the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team about 30 kilometers north of the then current front line. They did so, parachuting from over a hundred C-119 Flying Boxcar transport aircraft. When they landed they linked up with Task Force Growdon, which was made up of armored elements from the 24th Infantry Division (United States)’s 6th Medium Tank Battalion and infantry elements from the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division. The forces advanced to their goal, meeting weak resistance—mostly minefields—but the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (CPVA) had retreated before they got there.

One hundred twenty C-119s and C-46s dropped 3,437 paratroopers of the 187th Regimental Combat Team near Munsan-ni in the second largest airborne operation of the war.

Chinese Spring Offensive

Russian Hopes For A Ceasefire

Jacob Malik, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations, made a radio broadcast denouncing the United States on June 23, 1951. But he also hoped “for a cease-fire and an armistice providing for the mutual withdrawal of forces from the 38th parallel.” A newspaper in Peking endorsed this proposal two days later, and Truman asked Ambassador Alan Kirk to reach the Soviet government on this matter. [Brodie: 96]

After some debate on the meeting place (Ridgway initially wanted to meet on the Danish hospital ship Jutlandia in Wonsan Harbor), talks began in Kaesong.

The Summer of 1951

By the summer of 1951, the Korean War had reached a stalemate as peace negotiations began at Kaesong. The opposing armies faced each other across a line which ran (with many twists and turns along the way) from east to west, through the middle of the Korean peninsula, a few miles north of the 38th parallel. U.N. and communist forces jockeyed for position along this line, clashing in a number of relatively small, but intense and bloody battles.

Battle of Bloody Ridge

The Battle of Bloody Ridge took place during the Korean War from August 18 to September 5, 1951. Located in hills north of the 38th parallel in the central Korean mountain range, it was fought between the communist North Korean forces of the KPA (Korean People’s Army) and U.N. (United Nations) forces consisting of ROK (South Korean) units and the 2nd Infantry Division of the United States Army.

Bloody Ridge began as an attempt by U.N. forces to seize a series of hills forming a ridge which they believed were being used as observation posts to call in artillery fire on a U.N. supply road. The 36th ROK Regiment made the initial attack. It succeeded in capturing most, but not all, of the ridge after a week of fierce fighting that at times was hand to hand. It was a short-lived triumph, for the following day the North Koreans recaptured the mountain in a fierce counterattack.

The next U.N. assault was made by the U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division. The battle raged for ten days, as the North Koreans repulsed one assault after another by the increasingly exhausted and depleted 9th Infantry. After repeatedly being driven back, it succeeded in capturing one of the hill objectives after two days of heavy fighting. The weather then turned to almost constant rain, greatly slowing the attacks and making operations almost impossible because of the difficulty in bringing supplies through “rivers of mud” and up steep, slippery slopes.

Fighting continued, however, as casualties mounted. The 2nd Division’s 23rd Infantry Regiment joined the attack on the main ridge while the division’s other infantry regiment, the 38th, occupied positions immediately behind the main ridge which threatened to cut off any North Korean retreat. The combination of frontal attacks, flanking movements and incessant bombardment by artillery, tanks and airstrikes ultimately decided the battle. Finally, on September 5th, the North Koreans abandoned the ridge after UN forces succeeded in outflanking it.

The American soldiers called the piece of terrain they had taken Bloody Ridge, which indeed it was: 2,700 U.N. and perhaps as many as 15,000 communists were casualties, almost all of them killed or wounded, few prisoners being taken by either side.

After withdrawing from Bloody Ridge, the North Koreans set up new positions just 1,500 yards away on a seven-mile-long hill mass that was soon to earn the name Heartbreak Ridge.

French Warfare in Vietnam

Before the Korean War was concluded, the American government was already laying the groundwork for its presence in Vietnam. French General de Lattre de Tassigny visited Washington in September 1951, and the State Department gladly endorsed his aims and methods in Vietnam. [LaFeber: 116]

Heartbreak Ridge

The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge was fought between September 13 and October 15, 1951, in the hills of North Korea a few miles north of the 38th parallel (the prewar boundary between North and South Korea), near Chorwon.

Operation Hudson Harbor

Operation Hudson Harbor occurred in October 1951. It is notable for being the battle when Truman began asking himself whether the Americans can use nuclear weapons.

Commentary From Dr. Richard Hornberger

Richard Hornberger, a MASH doctor and the future creator of the book “MASH” (which, in turn, spawned the movie and television series), was full of humor and looked upon the war in the best spirits possible. In January 1952, for example, he wrote:

“Off and on we get some interesting work to do, some of it caused by the Chinamen, much of it caused by our own soldiers being hit by our own mortars, or trying to cross our own minefields. If we stay here long enough, the American Army may annihilate itself.” [Carroll: 51]

Not surprisingly for those who have seen the “MASH” television program, many of Hornberger’s letters revolved around baseball games, late-night poker and a fair share of drunken revelry.

The American Steel Strike

Sometimes wars are fought just as much militarily in the field as they are politically in the domestic arena. Such a case can be made of the steel strike that began in April 1952. When the mills were to shut down, Truman seized the mills and justified his actions in a radio address, stressing that steel production was crucial to the war effort.

This action was highly unpopular. The Supreme Court informed the President he had no such authority to seize the mills, the press was in favor of the Court’s decision, and Congress had no desire to grant Truman the legitimate authority to go ahead with the seizures.

When the mills were returned to the owners, the strike continued for fifty-three days. Upon the end of the strike, the price of steel was greatly inflated, leaving Truman with even more reason to want to bring this war to a quick halt. [Brodie: 101]

Old Baldy

The Battle of Old Baldy refers to a series of five engagements from June 26, 1952 and March 26, 1953 for Hill 266 in west-central Korea.

The Political Battle in America

The war in Korea did nothing to stop the Republicans in America from getting into squabbles with the Democrats over a variety of issues. With regards to communism, the Republican Party accused the Democrats of “selling out” Eastern Europe and betraying Chiang Kai-shek. The official Republican Party platform of July 7, 1952 (which Dwight D. Eisenhower stood behind) declared:

“[Roosevelt and Truman] flouted our peace-assuring pledges such as the Atlantic Charter, and did so in favor of despots, who, it was well-known, consider that murder, terror, slavery, concentration camps and the ruthless and brutal denial of human rights are legitimate means to their desired ends. Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam were the scenes of those tragic blunders with others to follow. The leaders of the Administration in power acted without the knowledge or consent of Congress or of the American people. They traded our overwhelming victory for a new enemy and for new oppressions and new wars which were quick to come.” [Spanier: 71]

This case against the Democratic Party and the idea of containment (which, in this author’s opinion, was poorly executed) had a resounding impact on the American people, as the elections of 1952 were soon to show.

The 19th Communist Party Congress

Surprisingly, in August 1952, Joseph Stalin called the 19th Party Congress to convene on October 5. This was surprising because despite the Party’s policy of meeting every three years, they had not had a prior Congress (the 18th) convene since 1939 — thirteen years ago. One could assume that Stalin expected the Congress to perform a specific function, quite possibly related to Korea. [LaFeber: 141]

A Case Of Poor Medical Treatment

Captain Molton A. Schuler, Jr. was involved in fighting in Chorwon, where the Chinese outnumbered the United Nations forces three to one. Schuler was hit by shrapnel, resulting in wounds to his neck, back and right leg. After being treated at a MASH unit, he was sent to a hospital in Tokyo, Japan. Schuler wrote to his wife:

“By now you have no doubt been notified that I was scratched up a bit on the morning of the 16th ‘in the vicinity of Chorwon, Korea.’ I only wish I could have beat the wire with a letter — this letter — for I know you were shocked.” [Carroll: 55]

Captain Schuler was right in reassuring his wife about his “scratches”, as the wounds were judged to be non-fatal. However, the medical attention he received was flawed: the blood transfusion he was given contained tainted blood plasma. Schuler died of hepatitis on August 24, 1952.

The Presidential Candidates Speak Out, Part One

On September 4, 1952 Republican nominee Dwight Eisenhower explained that the United States must protect “the far corners of the earth” which provide America with “materials essential to our industry and our defense.” This was far stronger language than Ike would use a month later. [LaFeber: 135]

Peace Talks Falter

On October 8, 1952, General Mark Clark called a halt to the “travesty” of the peace talks in Panmunjom, with the approval of Washington. America told China and North Korea that no plan would move forward until the Communists agreed to release American prisoners of war. Thus, the talks took a recess for six months. [Brodie: 102]

The Presidential Candidates Speak Out, Part Two

Democratic nominee Adlai Stevenson (who LaFeber calls the “literate” candidate) suggested on October 24, 1952 that American troops cannot leave Korea and allow “Asians to fight Asians,” like Eisenhower wanted. To do so “would risk a Munich in the Far East, with the probability of a third world war not far behind.” Stevenson saw the Asian upheavals rooted in nationalism — not international Communism, as Eisenhower did. [LaFeber: 135]

On the same day (October 24), Eisenhower spoke with much less militaristic language. He pledged that he would go to Korea, and saw the way of stopping Communism in Korea was by shaping “our psychological warfare program into a weapon capable of cracking the Communist front.” [LaFeber: 135]

Eisenhower Reverses Course

In the middle of the war (1952), Dwight D. Eisenhower is elected President of the United States. His policies can be viewed as contrary to the policies of Truman.

On November 29, 1952, U.S. President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower fulfilled a campaign promise by going to Korea to find out what could be done to end the conflict.

Within his first year as president, he ended America’s involvement in the Korean War and began to decrease both troop levels and defense spending (both of which went down over the next few years).

General VanFleet Retires

On February 11, 1953 Geneal VanFleet was relieved of duty by President Eisenhower so that he could go into retirement. His replacement as commander of the Eighth Army was Lieutenant General Maxwell Taylor, who would go on much later to be a central figure in the Vietnam War. [Brodie: 103]

The Death of Joseph Stalin

March 5, 1953.

Rhee Speaks Out

On April 26, 1953, the day before peace talks were to pick up again, President Syngman Rhee declared he could not accept any armistice that involved Chinese troops being left on Korean soil. [Brodie: 103]

The Air War Escalates

In early May 1953, American bombers destroyed hydroelectric power plants stationed along the Yalu River. Dams were also destroyed, flooding twenty-seven miles of farmland, turning it into nothing more than a swamp. The Air University Quarterly Review calculated these dams to be responsible for 75% of North Korea’s water supply for their rice production. Says the Review: “[T]o the Communists the smashing of the dams meant primarily the destruction of their chief sustenance — rice. The Westerner can little conceive the awesome meaning which the loss of this staple food commodity has for the Asian — starvation and slow death.” The Review further asserts the importance of these attacks when it says: “These strikes, largelt passed over by the press, the military observers and news commentators in favor of attention-arresting but less meaningful operations events, constituted one of the significant air operations of the Korea War.” According to journalist Seymour Hersh, this “was the first deliberate military attack on irrigation targets since Hitler’s Luftwaffe destroyed dikes and dams in Holland late in World War II.” [Hersh: 52]

Clark and Nuclear Weapons

In his memoirs, General Clark makes it known that on May 23, if the Communists rejected the final offer from the United Nations, he was authorized to “carry on the war in new ways never yet tried in Korea.” By this, Eisenhower meant nuclear weapons. [Clark: 267]

Third Battle of The Hook

The third Battle of the Hook was a battle that took place between a United Nations force, consisting mostly of British troops, supported on their flanks by American and Turkish artillery units against a predominantly Chinese force. It ran from May 28 to May 29, 1953.

Second Battle of Pork Chop Hill

On the night of July 6, 1953, using tactics identical to those in an April assault, the Chinese again attacked Pork Chop. The hill was now held by Company A, 17th Infantry, under the temporary command of 1st Lt. Richard T. Shea, Jr, its executive officer. Company B of the same regiment, in ready reserve behind the adjacent Hill 200, was immediately ordered to assist, but within an hour, Company A reported hand-to-hand combat in the trenches. A major battle was brewing and division headquarters ordered a third company to move up. The battle was fought in a persistent monsoon rain for the first three days, making both resupply and evacuation of casualties difficult. The battle is notable for its extensive use of armored personnel carriers in both these missions.

On the second night, the Chinese made a new push to take the hill, forcing the 7th Division to again reinforce. Parts of four companies defended Pork Chop under a storm of artillery fire from both sides. At dawn of July 8, the rain temporarily ended and the initial defenders were withdrawn. A fresh battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th, counter-attacked and re-took the hill, setting up a night defensive perimeter.

On both July 9 and July 10, the two sides attacked and counter-attacked. A large part of both Chinese divisions were committed to the battle, and ultimately five battalions of the 17th and 32nd Infantry Regiments were engaged, making nine counter-attacks over four days. On the morning of July 11, the commander of the U.S. U.S. I Corps decided to abandon Pork Chop Hill to the Chinese and the 7th Division withdrew under fire.

Four of the thirteen U.S. company commanders were killed. Total U.S. casualties were 243 killed, 916 wounded, and nine captured. 163 of the dead were never recovered. Of the Republic of Korea troops attached to the 7th, approximately 15 were killed and 120 wounded. Chinese casualties were estimated at 1,500 dead and 4,000 wounded.

The War Ends, Casualties Counted

The Korean War came to an end with a ceasefire on July 27, 1953. America and North Korea each sent a lieutenant general to meet in a special hut in Panmunjom, where they did not speak and each signed eighteen copies of the armistice agreement. Representing America was General William Harrison. (I currently have no source identifying the North Korean.) [Brodie: 104]

According to Goettel, the American forces had 157,000 casualties with 53,000 deaths. [Goettel: 195] Brodie’s numbers differ considerably. He records 33,629 dead and 103,284 wounded Americans. The South Korean military suffered a staggering blow with 415,004 dead and 428,568 wounded — these figures not including those gone missing or the massive civilian deaths. The other United Nations allies had over 3000 dead and more than 12,500 wounded or missing. [Brodie: 106]

Such a large number of casualties would be unthinkable in 21st century warfare; the Iraqi conflict from 2003-2007, for example, had just over 3000 American deaths — 6% of Korea’s figures (although this number is increasing as the war is ongoing as of this writing).

When Eisenhower pulled the troops from Korea, the conflict was considered a stalemate. While America successfully prevented a North Korean takeover of South Korea, they failed to remove Communism from North Korea. For all practical purposes, nothing changed in the few years spent in Korea.

Creation of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)

In the ceasefire of July 27, 1953, the Demilitarization Zone (DMZ) was created as each side agreed in the armistice to move their troops back 2,000 meters from the front line, creating a buffer zone four kilometers wide. The Military Demarcation Line (MDL) goes right down the center of the DMZ and indicates exactly where the front was when the agreement was signed. The armistice agreement was never followed by a peace treaty and technically the two Koreas are still at war.

Owing to this theoretical stalemate, and genuine hostility between the North and the South, large numbers of troops are still stationed along both sides of the line, each side guarding against potential aggression from the other side. The armistice agreement explains exactly how many military personnel and what kind of weapons are allowed in the DMZ itself. Soldiers from both sides do patrols inside the DMZ, but they may not cross the MDL.

The North failed in several assassination attempts on South Korean leaders, most notably in 1968, 1974 and 1983; tunnels were frequently found under the DMZ and war nearly broke out over the axe murder incident at Panmunjeom in 1976. In 1973, extremely secret, high-level contacts began to be conducted through the guise of the Red Cross, but ended after the Panmunjeom incident with little progress having been made.

The Sino-Soviet Split

If anything can be said to be gained by the Americans from the Korean Conflict, it is that this was to be the beginning of the rift between China and the Soviet Union. While both remained Communist, their weakened alliance was a major strategic advantage for the United States.

When Stalin passed away on March 5, 1953, the leadership of the Communist Party died with him. Who was to take his place? Mao Zedong, the leader of China and a powerful force in the Korean Conflict against America, assumed (and probably rightly so) that he was the most powerful Communist in the world. Regardless, the leadership was handed down to another Russian, Nikita Khrushchev. To say Chairman Mao was upset would be an understatement.

The Military-Industrial Complex

Looking back on the Korean War, we are left thinking that much of this death and bloodshed was unwarranted. Little if any advantage was gained by America. George Kennan’s moderate positions ignored, the country began down a new path — a path where military might overshadows the other great powers of the American people.

Eisenhower, upon leaving the presidency on January 17, 1961, warned the nation of the ability for the military and a military-based economy to overtake the country and its priorities:

“This conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience… we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.”

If America’s annual defense budget, or its entry into such wars as Vietnam or Iraq, is any indication, the words of President Eisenhower fell on deaf ears.

Sources

Akehurst, Michael. A Modern Introduction to International Law, Sixth Edition. Harper Collins, 1987.

Blum, William. Killing Hope: U.S. Military and C.I.A. Interventions Since World War II. Common Courage Press, 2004.

Brodie, Bernard. War & Politics. Macmillan Publishing Company, 1973.

Carroll, Andrew. War Letters: Extraordinary Correspondence from American Wars, Armed Services Edition. Washington Square Press, 2001.

Chomsky, Noam. Turning the Tide: U.S. Intervention in Central America and the Struggle for Peace. South End Press, 1985.

Chomsky, Noam. What Uncle Sam Really Wants. Odonian Press, 1992.

Clark, Mark W. From the Danube to the Yalu. Harpers and Row, 1954.

Goettel, Elinor. America’s Wars — Why? McDougal, Littell & Company, 1974.

Hersh, Seymour M. The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House. Summit Books, 1983.

Houn, Franklin W. A Short History of Chinese Communism, Completely Updated. Prentice-Hall, 1973.

LaFeber, Walter. America, Russia, and the Cold War, 1945-1971, Second Edition. John Wiley & Sons, 1972.

North, Robert C. Chinese Communism. World University Library, 1966.

Parmet, Herbert S. George Bush: The Life of a Lone Star Yankee. Transaction Publishers, 2001.

Spanier, John. American Foreign Policy Since World War II. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1980.

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